

COURT FILE NUMBER

2301- 02578

COURT

COURT OF KING'S BENCH OF ALBERTA

JUDICIAL CENTRE

CALGARY

PLAINTIFF

ENZIO HOLDINGS LTD.

DEFENDANTS

CANDRE CANNABIS INC., FRONDIS
HOLDINGS LTD., CALYPTRA CULTIVATION
INC. and JASMINE VENTURES LTD.

DOCUMENT

BENCH BRIEF OF THE RECEIVER

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND
CONTACT INFORMATION OF
PARTY FILING THIS
DOCUMENT

BENNETT JONES LLP

Barristers and Solicitors
4500 Bankers Hall East
855 – 2nd Avenue S.W.
Calgary, AB T2P 4K7

Attention: Chris Simard / Michael Selnes
Telephone No.: (403) 298-4485/3311
Fax No.: (403) 265-7219
Email: simardc@bennettjones.com /
selnesm@bennettjones.com

CLERK'S STAMP




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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Alvarez & Marsal Canada ULC was appointed as receiver and manager (the "**Receiver**") of certain of the current and future assets, undertakings and properties (the "**Property**") of Candre Cannabis Inc. ("**Candre**" or the "**Company**") pursuant to an Order of this Honourable Court (the "**Court**") dated March 6, 2023 (the "**Receivership Order**").
2. In the Receivership Order, the Court directed that the Property specifically excludes any of the Company's assets for which any permit or license is issued or may be issued in accordance or connection with the Controlled Substances Legislations (as defined in the Receivership Order) and pursuant to the Receivership Order the Receiver is not to take possession and is deemed to not be in possession of any such assets within the meaning of the Controlled Substances Legislation (the "**Excluded Assets**").
3. On March 24, 2023, the Receiver was granted approval by the Honourable Justice D.B. Nixon of the Court to conduct a sales and investment solicitation process (the "**SISP**").
4. The Receiver is applying to the Court on June 22, 2023, for orders, among other things:
 - (a) approving the June 6, 2023 Asset Purchase Agreement (the "**Sale Agreement**") entered into between the Receiver and Enzo Holding Ltd. ("**Enzo**" or the "**Purchaser**"); and
 - (b) sealing on the Court file Confidential Appendix "1" (the "**Confidential Appendix**") to the June 12, 2023 Third Report of the Receiver (the "**Third Report**").
5. The Receiver is filing this Bench Brief to put the relevant law before the Court with respect to the approval of the Sale Agreement and the requested sealing order. Capitalized terms that are used but not defined in this Bench Brief are intended to bear their meanings as defined in the Third Report or in the SISP.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

6. The Receiver undertook the SISP between March 27, 2023 and April 28, 2023. Among other things:
 - (a) the Receiver prepared and disseminated notices of the SISP in various news media and outlets;
 - (b) the Receiver prepared a teaser package and non-disclosure agreement (the "NDA") and delivered these materials to a list of potential bidders, including strategic parties and capital providers;
 - (c) the marketing process included multiple communications with various third parties regarding their interest in the opportunity at hand and the Receiver fielded questions from parties who had executed an NDA and were provided access to a data room of additional confidential due diligence information; and
 - (d) the Receiver hosted multiple parties at the Candre Facility who were interested in touring the Facility.
7. Ultimately, at the Phase 1 Bid Deadline, one non-binding letter of intent ("**LOI**") was submitted to the Receiver. This LOI expressed interest in leasing the Candre Facility rather than purchasing the Facility, and therefore the LOI did not constitute a Qualified LOI pursuant to the SISP Order, and the interested party was notified as such.
8. Prior to the Phase I Bid Deadline, Enzo notified the Receiver that it was reserving its right to credit bid up to the amount of its entire secured debt in the SISP. Enzo is the primary pre-Receivership secured creditor of Candre, and is owed approximately \$24.7 million by Candre.
9. With no Qualified LOIs received by the Phase 1 Bid Deadline, the Receiver extended the

Phase II Bid Deadline, ultimately to June 6, 2023, to allow additional time for Enzo and the Receiver to negotiate and execute the Sale Agreement.

10. A redacted copy of the Sale Agreement is attached as Appendix "A" to the Third Report. Key terms of the Sale Agreement include the following:
 - (a) the Purchaser is purchasing the Facility, together with the land, chattels, inventory, accounts receivable, packaging not described as Excluded Assets, and any other personal property of Candre used in the operation of its business at the Facility;
 - (b) the Purchaser is not purchasing the Excluded Assets, which are comprised of: permits, Health Canada licenses, excise tax stamps, leased equipment and any controlled substances subject to the *Excise Tax Act*;
 - (c) the Purchase Price is the aggregate of: (i) the accrued and unpaid amount of Receiver's Borrowings as at the Closing Date; (ii) a credit bid of Enzo's pre- Receivership debt, in an amount that is confidential and is identified in the Confidential Appendix; (iii) accrued and unpaid Priority Payables as at the Closing Date; and (iv) any cure costs associated with any assumed contracts;
 - (d) the vendor is assuming all Environmental Liabilities associated with the Facility, among other assumed liabilities;
 - (e) the Sale Agreement is conditional on Court approval, but is not otherwise subject to any extraordinary or onerous conditions; and
 - (f) closing of the purchase and sale transaction contemplated in the Sale Agreement (the "**Transaction**") is expected to occur three days after Court approval.

III. ISSUES

11. The following issues will arise at the Receiver's application on June 22, 2023:

- (a) Should the Sale Agreement and the Transaction be approved?
- (b) Should the Confidential Appendix be sealed on the Court file?

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Approving Asset Sales in Receiverships

12. When reviewing a proposed sale of assets by a receiver, the following criteria are to be considered:

- (a) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to obtain the best price and has not acted improvidently;
- (b) the interests of all the parties;
- (c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and
- (d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

Royal Bank v Soundair Corp., 1991 CanLII 2727 (Ont CA)

("Soundair") at para 16

13. The criteria and principles set out in *Soundair* have been adopted and applied by the Court of Appeal of Alberta.

Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. v 1905393 Alberta Ltd., 2019 ABCA 433

("Pricewaterhousecoopers") at paras 10-12

14. A receiver, in carrying out its duties and exercising its powers, is obligated to deal with the

debtor's property in a commercially reasonable manner. A court-appointed receiver is to be afforded deference. In particular, it is assumed that the receiver's course of action and recommendation are appropriate unless the contrary is clearly shown.

[*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC, 1985, c B-3*](#), s 247

[*Soundair*](#), *supra* at paras 46-48

(i) *Did the Receiver act providently and make sufficient efforts to receive the best prices for the assets*

15. In determining whether a receiver has acted providently, the Court is to examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. The recommendation of the receiver should be rejected in only the most exceptional circumstances.

[*Soundair*](#), *supra* at para 21

[*Pricewaterhousecoopers*](#), *supra* at para 14

(ii) *Is the proposed sale in the interests of the parties*

16. The primary concern in reviewing the interests of the parties is the interests of the creditors of the debtor. The receiver must consider the interests of all creditors and act for the benefit of the general body of creditors.

[*Soundair*](#), *supra* at paras 39-40

[*Alberta Treasury Branches v. Elaborate Homes Ltd.*](#), 2014 ABQB 350

("Elaborate Homes") at para 61

(iii) *Was there efficacy and integrity to the Receiver's process*

17. It is not necessary to scrutinize every element of the receiver's process in coming to the decision to accept an offer.

[*Crown Trust Co. v Rosenberg*, 1986 CanLII 2760 \(Ont SC\)](#)

("Crown Trust") at paras 65-66

18. Courts are to exercise caution before interfering with the process adopted by a receiver. It is integral to the receivership process that prospective purchasers know, if they have acted in good faith, bargained seriously and entered into an agreement with a receiver, that the Court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver regarding a sale.

[*Soundair*, supra](#) at para 46

[*Pricewaterhousecoopers*, supra](#) at para 14

19. Courts are to assume that a receiver has acted properly in dealing with the property of a debtor, unless the contrary is clearly demonstrated.

[*Soundair*, supra](#) at para 14

(iv) Was there unfairness in the Receiver's process

20. It is only in exceptional circumstances that a court is to find a sale process unfair and proceed contrary to the recommendation of the Receiver.

[*Crown Trust*, supra](#) at paras 67 and 77

B. Sealing of the Confidential Appendix

21. The Court has broad discretion to grant a sealing order, notwithstanding the provisions of Division 4 of Part 6 of the *Rules of Court*.

[*Alberta Rules of Court*, Alta Reg 124/2010](#), r 6.28

22. A temporary sealing order may be granted when:

- (a) an order is required to prevent serious risk to an important interest because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- (b) the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41

at para 45

23. The Supreme Court of Canada recently restated the test an applicant must satisfy in seeking a temporary sealing order. An applicant must demonstrate:

- (a) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;
- (b) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and
- (c) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects

Sherman Estate v Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 at para 38

24. Where information is commercially sensitive and assets are being sold pursuant to a Court process, it is common to seal commercially sensitive information. Such step is necessary in the event a further bidding or sale process is required, should the transaction being considered fail to close, and ensures fair play so that competitors and potential purchasers do not obtain an unfair advantage by obtaining such information.

Elaborate Homes, supra at para 54

Look Communications Inc. v Look Mobile Corp., 2009 CanLII 71005 (Ont SCJ)

(*"Look Communications"*) at para 17

Nortel Networks Corp. (Re), 2009 CarswellOnt 4838 at para 39 [TAB 1]

Maxtech Manufacturing Inc. (Re), 2010 ONSC 1161 at para 30

887574 Ontario Inc. v Pizza Ltd., 1994 CarswellOnt 1214 at para 6 [TAB 2]

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 16th DAY OF JUNE, 2023.

BENNETT JONES LLP

Per: _____



Chris Simard and Michael Selnes
Counsel for Alvarez & Marsal
Canada ULC

II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

TAB

Royal Bank v Soundair Corp., 1991 CanLII 2727 (Ont CA)

Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. v 1905393 Alberta Ltd., 2019 ABCA 433

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC, 1985, c B-3, s 247

Alberta Treasury Branches v. Elaborate Homes Ltd., 2014 ABQB 350

Crown Trust Co. v Rosenberg, 1986 CanLII 2760 (Ont SC)

Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010, r 6.28

Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41

Sherman Estate v Donovan, 2021 SCC 25

Look Communications Inc. v Look Mobile Corp., 2009 CanLII 71005 (Ont SCJ)

Maxtech Manufacturing Inc. (Re), 2010 ONSC 1161

1. *Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4838 (Ont SCJ [Commercial List])
2. *887574 Ontario Inc v. Pizza Pizza Ltd.*, 1994 CarswellOnt 1214

TAB 1

2009 CarswellOnt 4838
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Nortel Networks Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 4838, [2009] O.J. No. 4487, 56 C.B.R. (5th) 224

**In the matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended (Applicants)**

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Nortel Networks
Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited, Nortel Networks Global Corporation, Nortel
Networks International Corporation and Nortel Networks Technology Corporation

Morawetz J.

Heard: July 28, 2009
Judgment: July 28, 2009
Docket: Toronto 09-CL-7950

Counsel: Mr. D. Tay, Ms J. Stam for Nortel Networks Corporation et al.
Mr. J.A. Carfagnini, Mr. C.G. Armstrong for Monitor, Ernst and Young Incorporated
Mr. Arthur O. Jacques for Felske, Sylvain
S.R. Orzy for Noteholders
Ms S. Grundy, Mr. J. Galway for Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson
Ms L. Williams, Ms K. Mahar for Flextronics
Mr. M. Zigler for Former Employees
Mr. L. Barnes for Board of the Directors of Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited
Mr. A. MacFarlane for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
Ms T. Lie for Superintendent of Financial Services of Ontario
Mr. B. Wadsworth for CAW Canada
Mr. S. Bomhof for Nokia Siemens
Mr. R.B. Schwill for Nortel Networks UK Limited

Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIV](#) Administration of estate

[XIV.6](#) Sale of assets

[XIV.6.b](#) Sale by tender

[XIV.6.b.ii](#) Miscellaneous

Judges and courts

[XVI](#) Jurisdiction

[XVI.11](#) Jurisdiction of court over own process

[XVI.11.c](#) Sealing files

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate — Sale of assets — Sale by tender — Miscellaneous
Telecommunication company entered protection under [Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#) — Court order was granted
approving bidding procedures for sale of certain of Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access
— Three qualified bids were received by bid deadline — Highest offer was selected as starting bid — Auction was held —

Bid submitted by buyer was determined to be successful bid — Company brought motion for order approving and authorizing execution of asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Sale process was conducted in accordance with bidding procedures and with principles set out in jurisprudence — Consideration provided by buyer constituted reasonably equivalent value and fair consideration for assets.

Judges and courts --- Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction of court over own process — Sealing files

Telecommunication company entered protection under [Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#) — Company brought motion for order approving and authorizing execution of asset sale agreement and order sealing confidential appendixes to seventh report — Motion granted — Sealing order granted — Appendixes contained sensitive commercial information release of which could have been prejudicial to stakeholders.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 1986 CarswellOnt 235, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (note) (Ont. H.C.) — followed

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — considered

Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1240, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

MOTION by telecommunications company for approval of asset sale agreement, vesting order, approval of intellectual property licence agreement, order declaring that ancillary agreements were binding and sealing order.

Morawetz J.:

1 Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited (NNL), Nortel Networks Technology Corporation, Nortel Networks International Corporation and Nortel Networks Global Corporation, (collectively the "Applicants"), bring this motion for an Order approving and authorizing the execution of the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of July 24, 2009, ("the Sale Agreement"), among Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) (the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and NNL, NNC, Nortel Networks, Inc.) ("NNI" or ("Ericsson")), and certain of their affiliates as vendors, (collectively, the "Sellers"), in the form attached and as an Appendix to the Seventeenth Report of Ernst and Young Inc. in its capacity as Monitor in the [CCAA](#) proceedings.

2 The Applicants also request, among other things, a Vesting Order, an Order approving and authorizing the execution and compliance with the Intellectual Property Licence Agreement substantially in the form attached to the confidential appendix to the Seventeenth Report and the Trademark Licence Agreements substantially in the form attached to the appendix and an Order declaring that the Ancillary Agreements, (as defined in the Sale Agreement), including the IP Licences, shall be binding on the Applicants that are party thereto, and shall not be repudiated disclaimed or otherwise compromised in these proceedings, and that the intellectual property subject to the IP Licences shall not be sold, transferred, conveyed or assigned by any of the Applicants unless the buyer or assignee of such intellectual property assumes all of the obligations of NNL under the IP Licences and executes an assumption agreement in favour of the Purchaser in a form satisfactory to the Purchaser.

3 Finally, the Applicants seek an order sealing the Confidential Appendixes to the Seventeenth Report pending further order of this court.

4 This joint hearing is being conducted by way of video conference. His Honor Judge Gross is presiding over the hearing in the U.S. Court. This joint hearing is being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which has previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

5 The Applicants have filed two affidavits in support of the motion. The first is that of Mr. George Riedel, sworn July 25, 2009. Mr. Riedel is the Chief Strategy Officer of NNC and NNL. Mr. Riedel also swore an affidavit on June 23, 2009 in support of the motion to approve the Bidding Procedures. The second affidavit is that of Mr. Michael Kotrly which relates to an issue involving Flextronics which was resolved prior to this hearing.

6 The Monitor has also filed its Seventeenth Report with respect to this motion. The Monitor recommends that the requested relief be granted.

7 The Applicants' position is also enthusiastically supported by the Unsecured Creditors' Committee in the Chapter 11 proceedings and the Noteholders.

8 No party is opposed to the requested relief.

9 On June 29, 2009 this court granted an Order approving the Bidding Procedures for a sale process for certain of Nortel's Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") business, and Long Term Evolution ("LTE") Access. The procedures were attached to the Order.

10 The Court also approved the Stalking Horse Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens") and the Sellers (also referred to as the "Nokia Agreement") and accepted agreement for the purposes of conducting the Stalking Horse bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures, including the Break-Up-Fee and Expense Reimbursement as both terms are defined in the Stalking Horse Agreement.

11 The order of this court was granted immediately after His Honor, Judge Gross, of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

12 The Bidding Procedures contemplated a bid deadline of 4 p.m. on July 21, 2009. This gave interested parties 22 days to conduct due diligence and submit a bid.

13 By the Bid Deadline, three bids were acknowledged as "Qualified Bids" as contemplated by the Bidding Procedures. Qualified Bids were received from MPAM Wireless Inc., otherwise known as Matlin Patterson and Ericsson.

14 The Monitor also reports that on July 15, 2009 one additional party submitted a non-binding letter of intent and requested that it be deemed a Qualified Bidder. The Monitor further reports that upon receiving this request, the Applicants' provided such party with a form of Non-Disclosure Agreement substantially in the form as that previously executed by Nokia Siemens. This party declined to execute the Non Disclosure Agreement and was not deemed a Qualified Bidder. The Monitor further reports that it, the UCC and the Bondholder Group were all consulted in connection with the request of such party to be considered a Qualified Bidder.

15 The Monitor also reports that it is of the view that any party that wanted to bid for the business and complied with the Bidding Procedures was permitted to do so.

16 In the period up to July 21, 2009, the Monitor reports that it was kept apprised of all activity conducted between Nortel and the potential buyers. In addition, the Monitor participated in conference calls and meetings with the potential buyers, both with Nortel and independently. The Monitor further reports that it conducted its own independent review and analysis of materials submitted by the potential buyers.

17 On July 22, 2009, in accordance with the Bidding Procedures, copies of both the MPAM bid and the Ericsson bid were provided to Nokia Siemens, MPAM and Ericsson were both notified that three Qualified Bids had been received.

18 After consultation with the Monitor and representatives of the UCC and the Bondholder Group, the Sellers determined that the highest offer amongst the three bids was submitted by Ericsson and accordingly on July 22, 2009, the three Qualified Bidders were informed that the Ericsson bid had been selected as the starting bid pursuant to the Bidding Procedures. Copies of the Ericsson bid were distributed to Nokia Siemens and MPAM.

19 The Monitor reports that the auction was held in New York on July 24, 2009.

20 Pursuant to the Bidding Procedures the auction went through several rounds of bidding. The Sellers finally determined that the Ericsson bid submitted in the sixth round should be declared the Successful Bid and that the Nokia Siemens bid submitted in the fifth round should be an Alternate Bid. The Monitor reports that these determinations were made in accordance with consultations with the Monitor and representatives of UCC and the Bondholder group held during the seventh round adjournment.

21 The Monitor reports that the terms and conditions of the Successful Bid are substantially the same as the Nokia Agreement described in the Fourteenth Report with the significant differences being as follows:

1) The purchase price has been increased from U.S. \$650 million to U.S. \$1.13 billion plus the obligation of the Purchaser to pay, perform and discharge the assumed liabilities. The Purchaser made a good faith deposit of U.S. \$36.5 million.

2) The Termination Date has been extended to September 30, 2009 or in the event that closing has not occurred solely because regulatory approvals have not yet been obtained, October 31, 2009 as opposed to August 31 and September 30, respectively, for the Nokia Agreement.

3) The provisions in the Nokia Agreement with respect to the Break-Up Fee and Expense Reimbursement have been deleted.

22 Further, I note that the Nokia Agreement provided for a commitment to take at least 2,500 Nortel employees worldwide. Under the Sale Agreement, the Purchaser has also committed to make employment offers to at least 2,500 Nortel employees worldwide.

23 The Nokia Agreement provided for a payment of a Break-Up Fee of \$19.5 million and the Expense Reimbursement to a maximum of \$3 million, upon termination of the Nokia Agreement. The Monitor reports that if both this court and the U.S. Court approve the Successful Bid, the Applicants are of the view that the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement will be payable and in accordance with the order of June 29, 2009, the company intends to make such a payment. The Monitor reports that it is currently contemplated that 50% of the amount will be funded by NNL and 50% by NNI.

24 The assets to be transferred by the Applicants and the U.S. Debtors pursuant to the successful bid are to be transferred free and clear of all liens of any kind. The Monitor is of the understanding that no leased assets are being conveyed as part of this transaction.

25 The Monitor also reports that at the request of the Purchaser, the proposed Approval and Vesting Orders specifically approves Intellectual Property Licence Agreement and Trademark Licence Agreement, collectively, (the "IP Licences"), entered into between NNL and the Purchaser in connection with the Successful Bid.

26 The Monitor also reports that subject to court approval, closing is anticipated to occur in September 2009.

27 The Bidding Procedures provide that the Seller may seek approval of the next highest or otherwise best offer as the Alternate Bid. If the closing of the transaction contemplated fails to occur the Sellers would then be authorized, but not directed, to proceed to effect a Sale Pursuant to the terms of the Alternate Bid without further court approval. The Sellers, in consultation with the Monitor, the UCC and the Bondholders, determined that the bids submitted by Nokia Siemens in the fifth round with a

purchase price of \$1,032,500,000 is the next highest and best offer and has been deemed to be the Alternative Bid. Accordingly, the company is seeking court approval of the alternative bid pursuant to the Bidding Procedures.

28 The Monitor reports that, as noted in its Fourteenth Report, the CMDA division and the LTE business are not operated through a dedicated legal entity or stand alone division. The Applicants have an interest in intellectual property of the CMDA business and the LTE business which is subject to various inter-company licensing agreements with other Nortel legal entities around the world, in some cases on an exclusive basis and in other cases, on a non-exclusive basis. The Monitor is of the view that the task of allocating sale proceeds stemming from the Successful Bid amongst the various Nortel entities and the various jurisdictions is complex. Further, as set out in the Fifteenth Report, the Applicants, the U.S. Debtors, and certain of the Europe, Middle East, Asia entities, ("EMEA") through their U.K. Administrators entered into the Interim Funding and Settlement Agreement, the IFSA, which was approved by this court on June 29, 2009. Pursuant to the IFSA, each of the Applicants, U.S. Debtors and EMEA Debtors agreed that the execution of definitive documentation with a purchaser of any material Nortel assets was not conditional upon reaching an agreement regarding the allocation of sale proceeds or binding procedures for the allocation of the sale proceeds. The Monitor reports that the parties agreed to negotiate in good faith and attempt to reach an agreement on a protocol for resolving disputes concerning the allocation of sale proceeds but, as of the current date, no agreement has been reached regarding the allocation of any sales proceeds. Accordingly, the Selling Debtors have determined that the proceeds are to be deposited in an escrow account. The issue of allocation of sale proceeds will be addressed at a later date.

29 The Monitor expects that the Company will return to court prior to the closing of the transaction to seek approval of the escrow agreement and a protocol for resolving disputes regarding the allocation of sale proceeds.

30 In his affidavit, Mr. Riedel concludes that the sale process was conducted by Nortel with consultation from its financial advisor, the Monitor and several of its significant stakeholders in accordance with the Bidding Procedures and that the auction resulted in a significantly increased purchase price on terms that are the same or better than those contained in the Stalking Horse Agreement. He is of the view that the proposed transaction, as set out in the Sale Agreement, is the best offer available for the assets and that the Alternate Bid represents the second best offer available for the Assets.

31 The Monitor concludes that the company's efforts to market the CMDA Business and the LTE Business were comprehensive and conducted in accordance with the Bidding Procedures and is further of the view that the Section 363 type auction process provided a mechanism to fully determine the market value of these assets. The Monitor is satisfied that the purchased priced constitutes fair consideration for such assets and, as a result, the Monitor is of the view that the Successful Bid represents the best transaction for the sale of these assets and the Monitor therefore recommends that the court approve the Applicants' motion.

32 A number of objections have been considered by the U.S. Court and they have been either resolved or overruled. I am satisfied that no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment on this issue.

33 Turning now to whether it is appropriate to approve the transaction, I refer back to my Endorsement on the Bidding Procedures motion. At that time, I indicated that counsel to the Applicants had emphasized that Nortel would aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in the decision of *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), which, in turn, accepts certain standards as set out by this court in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87 (Ont. H.C.).

34 Although the *Soundair* and *Crown Trust* tests were established for the sale of assets by a receiver, the principles have been considered to be appropriate for sale of assets as part of a court supervised sales process in a CCAA proceeding. For authority see *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.).

35 The duties of the court in reviewing a proposed sale of assets are as follows:

- 1) It should consider whether sufficient effort has been to obtain the best price and that the debtor has not acted improvidently;

- 2) It should consider the interests of all parties;
- 3) It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and
- 4) It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

36 I am satisfied that the unchallenged record clearly establishes that the sale process has been conducted in accordance with the Bidding Procedures and with the principles set out in both *Soundair*, and *Crown Trust*. All parties are of the view that the purchase price represents fair consideration for the assets included in the Sale Agreement. I accept these submissions. The consideration provided by Ericsson pursuant to the Sale Agreement, in my view, constitutes reasonably equivalent value and fair consideration for the assets.

37 In my view, it is appropriate to approve the Sale Agreement as between the Sellers and Purchaser. I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the relief relating to the Vesting Order, the IP Licences, the Ancillary Agreement and the Alternate Bid, all of which are approved.

38 The Applicants also requested an order sealing the Confidential Appendixes to the Seventeenth Report pending further order. In considering this request I referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41 (S.C.C.), which addresses the issue of a sealing order. The Supreme Court of Canada held that such orders should only be granted when:

- 1) An order is needed to prevent serious risk to an important interest because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk;
- 2) The salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

39 I have reviewed the Confidential Appendixes to the Seventeenth Report. I am satisfied that the Appendixes contain sensitive commercial information, the release of which could be prejudicial to the stakeholders. I am satisfied that the request for a sealing order is appropriate and it is so granted.

40 Other than with respect to the payment and reimbursement of amounts in respect of the Bid Protections nothing in this endorsement or the formal order is meant to modify or vary any of the Selling Debtors' (as such term is defined in the ISFA) rights and obligations under the ISFA. It is further acknowledged that Nortel has advised that the Interim Sales Protocol shall be subject to approval by the court.

41 An order shall issue in the form presented, as amended, to give effect to the foregoing reasons.

Motion granted.

TAB 2

1994 CarswellOnt 1214

Ontario Court of Justice (General Division), Commercial List

887574 Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Ltd.

1994 CarswellOnt 1214, [1994] O.J. No. 3112, 23 B.L.R. (2d) 239, 35 C.P.C. (3d) 323, 52 A.C.W.S. (3d) 516

RE ARBITRATION BEFORE THE HONOURABLE R.E. HOLLAND, Q.C.

887574 ONTARIO INC., 863644 ONTARIO INC., 801409 ONTARIO INC., WESTBRIDGE FOODS LTD., 830542 ONTARIO INC., 779975 ONTARIO LIMITED, 783129 ONTARIO INC., 284055 ONTARIO INC., 946171 ONTARIO INC., 768027 ONTARIO INC., 841875 ONTARIO INC., 660840 ONTARIO LTD., BULE ENTERPRISES LIMITED, 900766 ONTARIO INC., 755950 ONTARIO LIMITED, 554135 ONTARIO INC., 769049 ONTARIO INC., 781380 ONTARIO INC., 892922 ONTARIO INC., 814591 ONTARIO INC., 925446 ONTARIO LTD., 876310 ONTARIO INC., 812138 ONTARIO INC., 880602 ONTARIO INC., 697339 ONTARIO INC., 863008 ONTARIO INC., 898201 ONTARIO INC., 989897 ONTARIO INC., 857387 ONTARIO INC., 828659 ONTARIO INC., 750242 ONTARIO LIMITED, 803767 ONTARIO INC., 910874 ONTARIO INC., 805837 ONTARIO INC., GOLD LION GROUP OF COMPANIES, 697246 ONTARIO LIMITED, 827532 ONTARIO INC., 914470 ONTARIO LIMITED, 804631 ONTARIO INC., 954270 ONTARIO INC., 686603 ONTARIO LIMITED, 741897 ONTARIO LIMITED, 675367 ONTARIO LIMITED, 809692 ONTARIO LIMITED, 681630 ONTARIO INC., 763012 ONTARIO LTD., 905933 ONTARIO INC., 945671 ONTARIO INC., 807352 ONTARIO INC. and 909206 ONTARIO INC. v. PIZZA PIZZA LIMITED

Farley J.

Oral reasons: December 14, 1994*

Written reasons: December 27, 1994

Docket: Doc. 93-CQ-33541; Commercial Court File Doc. B85/93

Counsel: *Peter Griffin*, *Gavin MacKenzie* and *Daniel Vukovich*, for moving party (defendant).

Nancy Spies and *Timothy Mitchell*, for responding parties (plaintiffs) except 828659 Ontario Inc., 805837 Ontario Inc., 807353 Ontario Inc., and Drag Eleven Pizza Inc.

P. Waldmann, for other responding parties (plaintiffs).

B. Bruser, for Toronto Star.

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

Judges and courts

[XVI Jurisdiction](#)

[XVI.11 Jurisdiction of court over own process](#)

[XVI.11.c Sealing files](#)

Headnote

Judges and Courts --- Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction of court over own process

Arbitration — Commercial arbitration — Large group of franchisees and their franchisor agreeing to discontinue litigation and settle their differences through arbitration — Arbitration agreed to be subject to appeal — Franchisor appealing arbitration award and franchisees cross-appealing — Application by franchisor for order directing material filed on appeal be sealed because arbitration to be kept confidential.

Practice — Practice on appeal — Record on appeal — Application by appellant from arbitration award for order directing record to be sealed denied — No evidence adduced to support any public policy grounds to depart from rule of public accessibility to court proceedings.

In 1993, 50 franchisees commenced legal proceedings against their franchisor, PP Ltd. Later, the parties entered into minutes of settlement whereby the dispute would be mediated and/or arbitrated by H, a retired judge and highly respected private arbitrator. The minutes of settlement also provided that the parties would have a right to appeal any binding decision by H. Arbitration proceedings ensued over many months and interim awards and a final award were issued by H.

He issued a confidentiality award with respect to the arbitration proceedings. This was followed by a consent order made by the judge before whom the present motion was argued confirming that the interim and final awards were to remain confidential until the final Award was filed in court.

PP Ltd. appealed four components of H's award. Six of the franchisees cross-appealed one component of the award. PP Ltd. then brought a motion seeking an order that the appeal material be sealed on the grounds that, (i) the arbitration proceedings were confidential by agreement, (ii) the parties would not have entered into the arbitration process without the condition of confidentiality, and (iii) the disclosure of the arbitration proceedings to the public could affect the competitive position of PP Ltd.

Held:

The motion was dismissed.

When a matter comes to court, the philosophy of the court system is openness. There are established exceptions to this general rule, such as actions involving infants or mentally disturbed people and actions involving matters of secrecy; however, this sealing application did not fit within any of those exceptions.

If the dispute settlement process had involved other types of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation, conciliation or neutral evaluation where the focus is on the parties' coming to a consensual arrangement, then other considerations could be brought to bear.

Curtailed public accessibility can be justified only where there is present the need to protect social values of great importance. This test is not met by wishing to keep secret the material involved in an arbitration appeal which of necessity takes the parties back into the court system with its insistence on openness, an aspect which one must assume the parties fully recognized before proceeding to appeal the award.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

A. (J.) v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (1989), 35 C.P.C. (2d) 6, 70 O.R. (2d) 27 (H.C.) — *considered*
Hassnah Insurance Co. of Israel v. Mew, [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243, (Q.B.D. [Com. Ct.]) — *considered*
London & Leeds Estates Ltd. v. Paribas Ltd. (July 28, 1994), Mance J. (Eng. Q.B.) [unreported] — *considered*
MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, 26 C.R. (3d) 193, 49 N.S.R. (2d) 609, 96 A.P.R. 609, 40 N.R. 181, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 385, 65 C.C.C. (2d) 129 — *followed*
MDS Health Group Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1993), 20 C.P.C. (3d) 137, 15 O.R. (3d) 630 (Gen. Div.) *applied*
S. (P.) v. C. (D.) (1987), 22 C.P.C. (2d) 225 (Ont. H.C.) — *applied*

Statutes considered:

Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17.

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 —

s. 137(2)

Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.1.

Words and phrases considered:

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

This [non-binding arbitration] differs from other forms of [Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR")] in which the parties themselves are part of the decision-making mechanism and the neutral third party's involvement is of a facilitative nature: e.g. mediation, conciliation, neutral evaluation, nonbinding opinion, nonbinding arbitration. Of course, the simplest method — often

overlooked — is that of noninvolvement by a neutral: a negotiation between the parties. It is not unusual that ADR resolutions are conducted privately, more to the point . . . it would be unusual to see a public ADR session especially where the focus is on coming to a consensual arrangement. The parties need to have the opportunity of discussion and natural give and take with brainstorming and conditional concessions giving without the concern of being under a microscope. If the parties were under constant surveillance, one could well imagine that they would be severely inhibited in the frank and open discussions with the result that settlement ratios would tend to dry up. The litigation system depends on a couple of percent of new cases only going to trial. If this were doubled to several percent the system would collapse . . . public policy supports the nontrial resolution of disputes.

.

. . . if the ADR process entered into is along the mediation philosophy structure that it will be appreciated that the best and most productive results re dispute resolution will be achieved generally if such process involves a degree of confidentiality. This of course is subject to some exceptions such as when the parties agree that in a mediation of public policy issues there is a positive requirement for public exposure . . . In other instances public exposure may induce a very negative reaction . . .

BINDING ARBITRATION

. . . a binding arbitration is a noncourt equivalent to a court trial. In either case a neutral third party hears the case and makes his decision which (subject to appeal) is binding upon the parties.

Motion for an order that material relating to appeal from commercial arbitration be sealed on grounds of confidentiality.

Editor's Note

This judgment, taken together with the arbitration award immediately preceding and the two reasons for judgment immediately following, forms an interesting quartet. It provides a basis for comment on several aspects of commercial arbitration in a general business setting. See the Case Comment at p. 277 post.

Farley J.:

1 At the hearing I dismissed the confidentiality/sealing motion, promising formal reasons at a later date. These are those reasons.

2 The defendant Pizza Pizza Limited ("P²") moved for an order:

(a) pursuant to Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C43 directing that the appeal materials upon the appeal to be heard on February 20, 1995 in this Honourable Court be sealed pending further order;

(b) continuing the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Farley dated July 20, 1994.

P² submitted that the grounds for such a motion were:

1. The parties were originally before this Honourable Court by way of injunction proceedings (and extensive materials) in the spring of 1993;
2. The parties entered into Minutes of Settlement by which they submitted these issues to arbitration/mediation before the Honourable R.E. Holland;
3. Those proceedings were, by agreement and by order of the Honourable R.E. Holland, confidential;
4. The arbitration proceedings were conducted over many months involving at least 20 days of hearing time, during which a wide range of issues were canvassed;

5. The parties would not have entered into the arbitration process without the condition of confidentiality;
6. The parties have expended significant amounts of money upon the arbitration proceedings;
7. Only a handful of the myriad issues before the Honourable R.E. Holland are the subject of the appeal herein;
8. The disclosure of the arbitration proceedings to the public may affect the competitive position of the defendant and its franchisees in releasing the details of its operations to the public and competitors;
9. To fail to continue the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Farley would discourage the attempts (and success) of the arbitration/mediation process which these parties underwent in confidence.

The aspect of item 8 was not in substance pursued. This is not in essence a situation involving trade secrets or confidential proprietary information. Further it was acknowledged that the proceedings resolved into an arbitration (versus other forms of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")).

3 On Wednesday, June 22, 1994, the Honourable R.E. Holland, Q.C. ("Arbitrator") issued a confidentiality order. This was followed by a consent order issued by myself on July 20, 1994. Its terms provided (and clearly contemplated not only that there could be an adjustment or amendment to or cancellation of the sealing order, but also that the award would be made public when the matter was in court):

It is hereby ordered that:

1. The Interim Award of the Honourable R.E. Holland dated April 8, 1994 and the Cost Award dated May 19, 1994 (the "Awards") are, as all of the proceedings in this matter, confidential and may not be released to any party other than the parties to this proceeding and their professional advisors in this proceeding.
2. Until such time as it is filed in court, the Final Award arising from the Awards (the "Final Award") is also confidential and may only be released to those parties identified above.

4 The award has been appealed by P² and cross-appealed by the plaintiffs. Thus the matter is "re-entering" the court system after functionally having been in the private confidential sector before the Arbitrator. When the matter went out to the arbitration, it may have been that the parties contemplated some form of arbitration, but it was also conceivable that another form of ADR could have been employed. I think it fair to observe that a binding arbitration is a non-court equivalent to a court trial. In either case a neutral third party hears the case and makes his decision which (subject to appeal) is binding upon the parties. This differs from other forms of ADR in which the parties themselves are part of the decision-making mechanism and the neutral third party's involvement is of a facilitative nature: e.g. mediation, conciliation, neutral evaluation, non-binding opinion, non-binding arbitration. Of course, the simplest method — often overlooked — is that of non-involvement by a neutral: a negotiation between the parties. It is not unusual that ADR resolutions are conducted privately; more to the point, I suspect it would be unusual to see a public ADR session especially where the focus is on coming to a consensual arrangement. The parties need to have the opportunity of discussion and natural give and take with brainstorming and conditional concession giving without the concern of being under a microscope. If the parties were under constant surveillance, one could well imagine that they would be severely inhibited in the frank and open discussions with the result that settlement ratios would tend to dry up. The litigation system depends on a couple of percent of new cases only going to trial. If this were doubled to several percent the system would collapse. Therefore in my view public policy supports the non-trial resolution of disputes. I note the observation of Oliver Tickell, "Shogun's Beginnings" *Oxford Today*, vol. 7, no. 1 Michaelmas Issue 1994 at p. 20 where he observed as to Professor Jeffrey Mass' view of the benefits of the first Shogunate in Japan:

... finding to [Professor Mass'] surprise that its rule was based far more on efficient administration than on military heroics. "Although a warrior government, it was devoted not to the battlefield but to maintaining the peace ... It developed laws, institutions of justice, and an adversarial legal system that even today seems extraordinarily ingenious and sophisticated.

Written evidence always took precedence over oral testimony, and women enjoyed their full day in court. The vendetta was illegal, as the objective was to keep people ensnared in litigation".

I also note that perhaps the legal sector in Canada has progressed a little too far in the ensnarement direction.

5 Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (CJA) provides:

A court may order that any document filed in a civil proceeding before it be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record.

However when a matter comes to court the philosophy of the court system is openness: See *MDS Health Group Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 630 (Gen. Div.) at p. 633. The present sealing application would not fit within any of the exceptions to the general rule of public justice as discussed in *A. (J.) v. Canada Life Assurance Co.* (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 27 (H.C.) at p. 34: "... actions involving infants, or mentally disturbed people and actions involving matters of secrecy '... secret processes, inventions, documents or the like ...' " The broader principle of confidentiality possibly being "warranted where confidentiality is precisely what is at stake" was also discussed at the same page but would not appear applicable.

6 Mr. Griffin raised the question of reorganization material under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 or the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 or valuations submitted by a receiver for the purpose of obtaining court approval on a sale arrangement having been sealed. The purpose of that, of course, is to maintain fair play so that competitors or potential bidders do not obtain an unfair advantage by obtaining such information whilst others have to rely on their own resources. I would think the most appropriate sealing order in a court approval sale situation would be that the supporting valuation material remain sealed until such time as the sale transaction has closed.

7 I believe that it is obvious that if the ADR process entered into is along the mediation philosophy structure that it will be appreciated that the best and most productive results re dispute resolution will be achieved generally if such process involves a degree of confidentiality. This of course is subject to some exceptions such as when the parties agree that in a mediation of public policy issues there is a positive requirement for public exposure: see Brown and Marriott, *ADR Principles and Practice* (1993, London), Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 356. In other instances public exposure may induce a very negative reaction — e.g. if outsiders can be observers, then some (depending on their relationship to the parties involved) may become "cheerleaders", "advisors without the benefit of the facts" or "advisors without the discipline of having to live with the end result of the mediation" (which may be a non-resolution of the issues which may otherwise have been resolved). Unwanted pressure may thus be applied to one or more of the participants. Similarly a volunteer advisor-type may give "free" advice (e.g. "Don't settle; take him to court; you've got an absolute winner!") when the hidden agenda of this officious intermeddler is to foment disruption, harass the other side or pursue his own self interests. Allow me to observe that it would be unusual for anyone to feel obliged to conduct all of his negotiations (including those to settle disputes) in a fishbowl: Consider for instance one having a mild disagreement with one's mother as to where the two of you should have lunch — or a debate between a customer and a supplier over whether an order was short-shipped and, if so, what adjustment should be made (all without resort to the *Sale of Goods Act* and/or the courts).

8 While it is true that it appears in this case that the parties went private in a dispute which they could have litigated openly in the courts with a trial rather than an arbitration, I do not see that this choice would oblige the parties to make their arbitration public in and of itself. As for the confidentiality order of July 20, 1994 referring to two types of awards, an interim and a final, I now understand from counsel that the thrust of the interim award was the legal principles and of the final the damage calculation or other results flowing as opposed to the interim being a draft for comment and possible adjustment. If the latter were the case then one would appreciate the practicality/necessity of maintaining confidentiality so as to avoid the types of unwarranted pressures aforesaid in achieving the end result. If of the other nature, I believe the same result prevails. Similarly if the process were something other than non-binding arbitration, one would also see the same type of necessity. In the instant case, the parties could have, if they had so chosen (i.e. either side), decided not to appeal the Arbitration's award. In such case, the result would have been the same as the two sides entering into settlement negotiations to end their dispute and coming to an agreement. In effect that is what they did by entering the arbitration process except that in doing so, they at the start of the piece delegated the resolution determination function to the Arbitrator for him to do so by applying legal principles to the facts as he found

them. If the parties had not made the detour from the main channel of court proceedings leading to trial by going to arbitration but had merely negotiated a settlement, then with a settlement achieved they would customarily merely proceed to put on the public court record that the claim had been dismissed on consent. Details of the settlement would remain with the parties; they would be free to disclose or agree not to disclose, subject to some legal obligation to make disclosure (e.g. timely disclosure requirements under securities legislation).

9 However in this case, it appears that both sides were dissatisfied to some degree by the decision of the Arbitrator for various reasons. Perhaps counsel would be of assistance to their clients if they were able to reflect upon what may have been attempted to be communicated by the other side at the hearing before me. I state the obvious: sometimes signals are obliquely broadcast; sometimes what might be perceived as a signal is nothing more than a false hope by the recipient. However if there is truly a signal intended, it would be very unfortunate if the recipient did not pick it up because it was too oblique or worse still because the mind was closed (possibly because the mouth was open so as to block the ear passage).

10 The onus is upon P² as moving party to demonstrate sound reason for departing from the openness rule: See *MDS*, supra, at p. 633. As the factum of P² put it:

There is an overriding public interest in the 1990's especially in fostering effective Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") in such a way that parties will willingly submit to it in a manner which fosters its use and development and reduces the demands for scarce court resources.

The authority for this was given as *Brown and Marriott*, supra, at p. 356; *London & Leeds Estates Ltd. v. Paribas Ltd.*, unreported decision of Mance, J. (Q.B.) of July 28, 1994 and *Hassnah Insurance Co. of Israel v. Mew*, [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243 (Q.B. [Com. Ct.]). In citing *Hassnah*, Mance, J. at p. 8 of *London* merely stated:

There is no doubt that the parties to such a previous arbitration owed each other a duty of confidence and privacy in respect of the course of and evidence given during it.

He went on to say at p. 9:

None of those authorities deals with the need to consider the rights of a witness which could arise if duties of confidentiality or privacy were owed to him or her. Despite this I see some force in the submission that it is implicit in the nature of private consensual arbitration that witnesses who give evidence, even paid and professional experts, will within certain limits be accorded the benefits of the privacy which overall attaches to this type of arbitration. The privacy of arbitration is likely to be a factor in persuading many witnesses to give evidence and a factor in encouraging them to speak, or in the case of experts, enabling them to obtain permission from other principals to speak, about matters within their experience about which otherwise they might be hesitant or unable to speak.

London of course involved a question of whether a subpoena to an expert witness should be set aside where the confidential or private documents of the expert were sought to be obtained by the subpoena. It is even clearer in *Hassnah* what the limits of confidentiality would be concerning an arbitration and the award issuing therefrom. In that case there was an arbitration between the defendant who was reinsured by the plaintiff under various reinsurance contracts which had been placed by brokers. The defendant pursued arbitration to recover under the policies; the arbitration went mainly against the defendant which now wished to proceed in court against the placing brokers for negligence in breach of duty. Coleman, J. found as stated in the headnote: "that if it was reasonably necessary for the establishment or protection of an arbitrating party's legal rights vis-a-vis a third party that the award should be disclosed to that third party in order to found a defence or as the basis for a cause of action, so to disclose it including its reasons would not be a breach of the duty of confidence (See p. 249, col. 2)".

11 However as discussed above the parties clearly contemplated the possibility of appeal pursuant to the *Arbitration Act, 1991*, S.O. 1991, c. 17. Both have availed themselves of that opportunity; the court files for whatever is filed pursuant to that appeal (and cross-appeal) will be open for inspection in the same way any other appeal of whatever nature or kind would be (assuming no valid sealing order obtained on the basis of the reasons set out above). This is not a case such as *Hassnah* where

witness statements, documents and transcripts of a confidential arbitration were not to be made public for the purpose of a court action against a third person-*Hassnah* being a completely "separate" proceeding. In this case (the P² case) the court proceedings are merely the continuation of the fight between P² and the plaintiff franchisees (and not between one of them and a third person in separate proceedings), a fight which they took private but which they have now returned to the open arena of the court.

12 As Dickson, J. said at p. 186 (S.C.R.) of *MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, 49 N.S.R. (2d) 609 (and cited in *MDS*, supra, at p. 635):

In my view, curtailment of public accessibility can only be justified where there is present the need to protect social values of superordinate importance. One of these is the protection of the innocent.

In my view "one of these" is not to keep secret the material involved in an arbitration appeal which of its necessity takes the parties back into the court system with its insistence on openness for court proceedings, an aspect which one must assume each side fully recognized before proceeding to appeal the award.

13 I believe it well expressed by Smith, J. in *S. (P.) v. C. (D.)* (1987), 22 C.P.C. (2d) 225 (Ont. H.C.) at p. 229 and p. 231:

It may be argued that private litigants resorting to our public justice system should have the right to do so away from the public glare. The answer, very simply put, is that secrecy can only attend a private system of justice, not a public one. Or put in a different way, publicity is a necessary consequence of the obvious benefits that are derived from a public system put in place to serve society in general, including private litigants (p. 229).

.

There is no need to refer to the voluminous case law bearing upon the general principles of openness of Court proceedings. There is a dearth of authority on the interpretation of s. 147(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*. Suffice it to say that it ought to be resorted to sparingly in the clearest of cases and on the clearest of material where as one instance the interests of justice would be subverted and/or the totally innocent would unduly suffer without any significant compensating public interest being served (p. 231).

14 P² has not adduced any evidence to support a sealing order pursuant to s. 137(2) CJA but rather it has relied on the court to fashion an order so as to extend the confidentiality which the parties had in their arbitration to the material in that arbitration which would otherwise be public pursuant to the appeal. I see no public policy grounds for doing so.

15 Mr. Griffin with his usual candour immediately agreed with Mr. Waldmann's proposition that if the sealing motion were dismissed then Mr. Waldmann's two clients outside the arbitration would be allowed access to the arbitration material.

16 The sealing order motion of P² is dismissed. P² is to pay \$1,000 in costs forthwith to the plaintiffs represented by Ms. Spies and Mr. Mitchell; no other costs awarded.

Motion dismissed.

Footnotes

- * Leave to appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was refused with costs on June 7, 1995, Doc. CA M15773, McKinlay, Griffiths and Doherty J.J.A. (Ont. C.A.).